1o48 9/11 and the past andfuture of American foreign policy Thereafter, fear shaped strategy, elevating pre-emption to a new degree of importance. When the stakes and consequences appear small, explained former CIA director Robert Gates, policy-makers seek a high degree of assurance before acting. But if one expects another major attack on the United States, the 'risk calculus' changes dramatically.22 The events of 9/ I demonstrated to officials that terrorists who declare their intent to kill Americans and attack the United States would plan for years, stealthily assemble their assets and take action when opportunity allowed. There would be no warnings. 'Where's the evidence of imminent threat?' exclaimed Wolfowitz before a joint congressional inquiry into the events leading up to 9/I .23 After September i i, he stressed, 'we have a visceral understanding of what terrorists can do with commercial aircraft, in a way that seemed remote and hypothetical before. We cannot afford to wait until we have a visceral understanding of what terrorists can do with weapons of mass destruction, before we act to prevent it.'24 As a result, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz argued the case for pre-emption. 'It is difficult', acknowledged Rumsfeld, 'for all of us who have grown up in this country, and believe in the principle that unless attacked, one does not attack,' to accept the notion of pre-emption. 'The question', he then went on to muse, 'is in the 2Ist century, with biological weapons ..
. that could kill hundreds of thousands of people, what does one do? Does one wait until [one is] attacked, or does one look at a pattern of behavior, a ... fact pattern and draw a conclusion?'25
Pre-emption was the inescapable conclusion, but pre-emption alone did not dictate the new military posture of the Bush administration. Defence officials also wanted new military capabilities to reassure allies and deter enemies. Should deterrence fail, they wanted to be able to wage war swiftly and defeat adversaries decisively. Of course, they preferred not to fight, not even to be challenged. US forces, the strategy statement emphasized, should be 'strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries' from even trying to equal or surpass American power. 26 Power was not an end in itself. Bush's advisers wanted to mobilize power to thwart threats, foster peace and build freedom. 'After 9/I I,' Condoleezza Rice stated, 'there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security-a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, World War II, or the Cold War.'27 The threat emanates from the nexus of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and aggressive tyrants in command of rogue states. Faced with this threat, Bush's national security strategy is said by its spokespersons to offer a 'bold vision' that 'captures new realities and new 22 The term 'containment' was placed in quotation marks in the document because it was never simply about blocking further Soviet expansion; nor was deterrence simply about thwarting a Soviet attack. Containment, in the words of NSC 68, was a policy of 'calculated and gradual coercion'.43 Inherent in its logic was the notion of risk-taking: taking action, often unilaterally, that was designed sometimes to thwart Soviet advances and sometimes to roll back Soviet influence. The intent was 'to wrest the initiative' from the Soviet Union; the axiomatic belief, again to use the famous words of NSC 68, was 'that the cold war is in fact a real war'. military superiority as new, daring and provocative, but only because they now remember the Cold War as a benign struggle between a hapless foe with an antiquated ideology and a crippled economy. That ignores, however, the fact that at the time participants thought they were engaged in a dynamic, dangerous and contingent conflict.
If the quest for military superiority is not so different from what it was during the Cold War, neither is the strategy of pre-emption. 'Preemption', stressed Rice, 'is not a new concept. There has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country must wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats ... The United States has long affirmed the right of anticipatory self-defense-from the Cuban missile crisis in I962 to the crisis on the Korean peninsula in I994. '45 Here again, Rice is quite right in stressing continuities. Pre-emption has a long tradition in American history. In I904 President Theodore Roosevelt announced a new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally asserting the right of the United States to intervene militarily in the western hemisphere to preserve order. 'Pre-emptive imperialism' was designed to thwart prospective European interventions and protect the national security of the United States. The United States intervened repeatedly in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti. In Nicaragua, US troops remained from I912 to 1933 (with one brief interruption); in Haiti they stayed from I915 to I934; in the Dominican Republic from I916 to 1924.46 Pre-emption, then, is not new; but it has a place of special importance in the thinking of Bush's defense advisers. It is 'fundamental', Wolfowitz told a joint congressional committee. 'This is not a game we will ever win on defense. We'll only win it on offense.'47 Although this attitude is often portrayed as unique to a group of neoconservative hawks who have infiltrated the Bush administration, the truth of the matter is that the proclivity towards an offensive strategy, towards pre-emption and counterproliferation, had been evolving for a decade and had mustered bipartisan support long before Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz became household names. In a partially declassified presidential directive of I995, Bill Clinton put his imprimatur on a new United States counterterrorism policy. neoconservative hawks but by Gary Hart, a liberal Democrat, and Warren Rudman, a moderate Republican. Reporting long before 9/I I, their commission envisioned a more chaotic world. Some states, the report concluded, would fragment; others would fail. Ethnic and religious violence would increase; suppressed nationalisms would flower; terrorist groups would proliferate; weapons of mass destruction would spread. Consequently, the United States would become 'increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland'. In that environment, the American government would not be able to rely on traditional alliances. Deterrence, the report stressed, 'will not work as it once did'. The United States, therefore, required military capabilities 'characterized by stealth, speed, range, unprecedented accuracy, lethality, strategic mobility, superior intelligence, and the overall will and ability to prevail'.49
Such reports and others make it clear that the strategic thinking associated with the Bush administration was emerging in a variety of forms well before 9/II. Almost everyone in the United States who carefully examined national security issues in the 990os grasped the growing threat of terrorism, the links with failing and rogue states, and the spectre of an attack on the United States with weapons of mass destruction. Many and diverse people called for preventive action. Many struggled, however reluctantly, with pre-emptive scenarios. Many grasped the reality that there were terrorist groups that were not likely to be deterred as states had been deterred. If these research findings withstand scrutiny, Bush's national security advisers have reason to hope that their policies will produce more good than their critics believe. This, however, assumes that they will focus on the goals of democracy promotion and economic development.63 Condoleezza Rice says they will. The United States will, she insists, fight 'poverty, disease, and oppression because it is the right thing to do-and the smart thing to do'. 64 At times of existential crisis in the past, at times when dangers seemed to loom very large and very close, Bush's predecessors sought to tackle root causes and establish lasting institutions. Wilson focused on the League; Franklin Roosevelt helped craft the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations; Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy sought to fashion the political and economic instruments that nurtured the recovery of Germany and Japan and facilitated their peaceful integration into the international system. In I947, at the most crucial moment in the origins of the Cold War, when Truman, like Bush today, then decided that the world was divided into good and evil-the president made the crucial decision to focus on European reconstruction rather than American rearmament.87 Notwithstanding America's abiding concern with calculations of military power, its greatest triumphs in the Cold War stemmed from its capacity to work with democratic allies and to design new international norms and multilateral institutions to serve shared objectives.88
The point of these comparisons is not to glorify the past. Neither Wilson, nor Roosevelt, nor Truman ever renounced the use of power, or relinquished the freedom to act unilaterally, or countenanced serious infringements of US sovereignty. But their apocalyptic fears and messianic zeal prompted a very different matrix of policies. They, too, believed that America had a mission; they, too, stirred that peculiarly American brew of power and ideals. But, ultimately, their thought processes gravitated towards a community of power rather than a balance of power. The difference in mindsets revealed by these contrasting operational codes is fundamental. In seeking a balance of power favouring freedom, in questing for military hegemony, in trumpeting the right to intervene unilaterally, in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and other arms control and human rights conventions, Bush and his advisers display a fundamental disdain for the norms, institutions and rules that bind the community in whose interests they are ostensibly acting.89
But they should not be criticized for highlighting the threats that confront humankind. Their fear of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists or arbitrary governments is well founded; their belief that advances in technology abet the cause of terrorists is not erroneous; their understanding that porous borders provide opportunities for sabotage is not irrational; their conviction that weak states and rogue governments may provide safe havens for terrorists is grounded in reality. Like Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, like Truman and the cold warriors who succeeded him, Bush rightly sees peril lurking in the international environment. But there is reason to be hopeful. As we have seen, Bush's policies are rooted in the traditional American matrix of values, interests and power. These variables have a dynamic and unstable relationship to one another and can be configured in different ways, with strikingly different implications. In the background of Bush's strategy lurks a recognition that pre-emption should not be a first option; that root causes cannot be ameliorated by the application of force; that a democratic peace can make for a more peaceful world; that multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The potential, therefore, exists for a different strategy; but its emergence will depend on the policies of America's friends abroad as well as on domestic politics and legislative-executive relations at home. There are indications, however, that the American people would support a different matrix of policies, a blend that might allow for the integration of balance of power thinking with a community of power approach, a blend that might reconcile hegemony and community. The data suggest that a reliance on pre-emptive and unilateralist military power is not inscribed in the DNA of the American people. In the past America's greatest leaders, when faced with perceptions of existential threats, chose to reconcile principles and power in favour of institutions, regimes, alliances and norms that meshed America's interests with those of a larger community of democratic allies. Wilson had a peculiar insight when he said the peace must be secured by the organized moral force of mankind. How to translate that moral force into pragmatic responses to the perils awakened by the attack on 9/I is the challenge before us.
Bush's national security doctrine is not likely to do the job. While he has alerted us to dangers that cannot be ignored and identified many strands of a solution, he has invoked a balance of power vocabulary that trivializes the very dilemmas he envisions. There is a different vocabulary in the American past from which better answers can be constructed. There is a tradition that recognizes that in the pursuit of national security, the use of American power and the dissemination of American ideals must be reconciled with the needs of friends, the sensibilities of adversaries and the well-being of the international community. Without such a reconciliation, the moral force of humankind will not be organized, and America's own quest for redemption in the face of apocalyptic threat will not be realized. I_report.htm.
